First a short preface—what follows is an extended postscript and clarification of my essays, “That Notorious Phrase Free Will” and “Consciousness, Human Action and Cognition”. Both examined issues central to understanding the nature of our species. While their eventual resolution lies in the future, continuing to articulate useful descriptions of human agency helps counteract ideas and intellectual habits that have brought little help to discussions, and at times added confusion.

My 7-15-18 essay presented a naturalistic model for human agency, where each of us is bracketed by our individual histories, both genetically and experientially. Our unique, individual histories are who we are: conceptual patterns, memories, emotional inclinations, cognitive skills and patterns, a mass of information our brain stores and utilizes in the complex electro-chemical processes that take place. Our brain’s processing of information—thinking, deciding, feeling, all that we experience—can be pictured as a web of relationships, and these electro-chemical patterns create what we experience as thinking, deciding and consciousness itself. What we term our mind is the brain at work. Because this is a fully naturalistic model, descriptions will remain consistent with contemporary science, specifically neuroscience, cognitive psychology and empirically-based philosophical thinking. Implicit in this approach is the view that our thinking, experiencing and emotional reactions constantly evolve as our brain (our mind) processes information. We are aware of some aspects of these patterns, but others are ordinarily not apparent to us without systematic, rigorous self-assessment. As Daniel Kahneman has maintained, our lack of awareness can be especially true of biases, values, emotional responses and heuristics. Further, we can view our mind as comparing and sorting information much like a computer, but at present it is not clear whether the mind’s biologically-based electro-chemical processes are sufficiently similar to those of complex, silicon-based systems, for the comparison to hold at the most significant level—a system having consciousness. The truth or falsity of such an important and symbolic likeness is an empirical question to be determined in the future, as AI grows in sophistication.

A naturalistic account of human agency, where every aspect of our nature is consistent with the laws of physics and chemistry, suggests several thought-provoking questions. Would such consistency imply all human actions are determined by antecedent events and conditions, so that a person’s specific actions could not have been otherwise? Is human behavior strictly predictable if sufficient information is available? If we are not inclined to say “yes” to these questions, a persuasive alternative account of human agency is needed, and the key words determined” and “predictable” require clarification. Because much human behavior is often predicted with considerable reliability, its reality needs to be understood and imbedded in any credible account. Further, the two key questions posed above can be challenged as ill-framed, and hence leading us astray. This important issue requires careful consideration. More broadly, the end result of this essay is a proximate description of human agency consistent with contemporary science, yet also accepting an interpretation of human action which supports a set of strongly held beliefs about our species. Conversely, which beliefs commonly associated with humans should be absent from a naturalistic account?

A helpful approach in thinking about these issues begins with comparing several models (paradigms) common in describing systems, both human and otherwise. A first step is entering Isaac Newton’s world where laws describe relatively simple relationships between objects, all common in our experience and reasonably intuitive. Paradigmatic examples are the interactions of billiard balls and the mathematical relationships of astronomical objects.

Newtonian models—billiard balls and astronomical predictions: their most obvious feature is relative simplicity in number and relationship, although astronomical models must deal with vastly more variables and greater mathematical complexity. Given sufficiently precise measurement and calculation, results are predictable with resounding accuracy, supporting assumptions of rigid determinism. Alternative outcomes require alternative initial conditions. The truism that available data for Newtonian calculations can never be absolute (in the sense of comprising the totality of initial conditions), and the unavoidable influence of random elements, do not affect the functional accuracy of most mathematical and engineering predictions. Very small gaps in information can be self-cancelling, or too minor to invalidate the predictive process, especially on human time scales. For Newton’s world, the lack of absolute information for predictions does not seriously weaken the appeal of a strongly deterministic model.

Some commentators have viewed these models as ideal or inclusive examples of genuine descriptions, presuming they define any process or interaction legitimately studied by scientific inquiry, even for the biological species Homo sapiens. In these cases writers have accepted, at least provisionally and with the exacting caveat of adequate initial conditions, the suitability of the Newtonian model for offering relevant descriptions of human systems. This essay presents the view where Newtonian models, no matter how advanced and data-rich, are not strictly appropriate for interpreting human agency, but it is incumbent upon any writer to offer a reasoned alternative. Credible alternatives cannot imply humans are not part of the natural world, or are not subsumed under the laws of physics and chemistry. As many have presumed, the reality of human agency is singularly complex, nuanced and problematic to articulate, but this does not imply commonly used “free will” language can be a reasonable alternative to Newtonian determinism.

Biological model—humans as complex, adaptive systems processing information: all of us frequently act in predictable ways, and on a daily basis we make predictions, both conscious and unconscious, about our partner’s, friends’ or co-workers’ likely actions. These predictions (expectations) are often successful because of our deep familiarity with another person’s interests, personality and past behavior, both conscious and unconscious, that we, as yet another complex, adaptive system, process (consciously and unconsciously). Admittedly, the success of our predictions (expectations) is by no means assured, and can vary considerably depending upon the category of behavior in question. Reactions to simple stimuli such as loud, unexpected noises or shouts, are predicted with high likelihood, whereas anticipating someone’s decision during a difficult life juncture, or their solution to a problem-solving task, is less successful. The former is much like a classic stimulus-respond pattern, while the latter can become particularly challenging, where our predictions carry a lower likelihood. But we all experience complex behavior where we predict with success based upon our deep familiarity with a person. This reality is not surprising; neuronal patterns are not merely random.

Before more fully developing the biological model of a person, a helpful stance is acknowledging that our success in predicting another person’s actions indicates solely our genuine knowledge of their humanity and individuality. Our success does not necessarily reveal a rigid model of human determinism, or imply the concept of agency is vacuous. And surely, a person’s actions express their individual genetic and environments histories—each person’s interests, desires and hopes. To think otherwise would imply humans act in bizarre, random patterns. That our actions can regularly be anticipated by those who know us best, does reveal a centered person functioning normally. Unfettered individuals display their capacity for self-expression in uncounted ways; at times a person’s actions can be surprising (unpredicted). In both cases haman actions can be described as unfettered or “free”, without the dubious trappings of the phrase “free will”. This unfortunate, but well-intentioned, phrase is commonly used to contrast simple, Newtonian systems from human beings, but its price is metaphysical vagueness and non-sequiturs.

As mentioned earlier, some writers have argued any human action, even the most complex processing, can be absorbed into a Newtonian model, assuming the existence of total data about a person’s neuronal states. Whether or not total data could ever be accessible is not necessarily germane to the issue, because the argument states that, in reality, something like Newtonian determinism exists for humans, even if real-life predictions could never be performed. This issue will be addressed near the end of the essay.

Biological model—humans as complex, adaptive systems processing information, thinking thoughts and acting in unique, innovative and unpredictable ways: how can creative and innovative actions be accounted for, whether musical compositions, ideas, solutions to problems and challenges, new social relationships, works of art, etc? Instances of uniqueness—thoughts or actions never before occurring—require an explanation.

As complex animals all humans “do things”—we seek and achieve goals, are dynamic, learning, ever curious, both caring and competitive, and continually engaged in enhancing our awareness of the world around us. We are alive—and possess brains of exceptional complexity and plasticity. Humans are self-contained organisms—systems with some degree of coherence and autonomy, and constantly affected by environmental stimuli. Further, we should not exclude other complex animals from some of the general descriptions we use for ourselves. And everything we claim about our species must remain consistent with the laws of chemistry and physics, although how we picture our mind processing information may not be identical with how we picture relationships between less complex objects. The intricacy and integration of the brain—and its role as the essence of the human biological system—provide a framework for understanding the character of human creativity, innovations and other unique actions. While the word “alive” is inclusive of a spectrum of biological systems, from the very simple to the extremely complex, the human brain’s activities—problem-solving, learning, goal seeking, adapting—require carefully crafted descriptions.

Imagine someone faced with a problem-solving challenge. Their brain is imbedded with a mass of pre-existing information—conceptual patterns and skills, memories, emotional pattern and other individual histories—plus information concerning their immediate challenge. The brain’s electro-chemical processing utilizes a web of interrelationships reaching an unimaginably large information base, producing an extensive tally of possible combinations. But very real parameters—genetic and experiential—bracket possible solutions to a person’s problem-solving task. To this degree any person’s problem solving potential is constrained by pre-conditions, thereby influencing the number of possible outcomes. These constraints on our neuronal activity affect the range of outcomes (what we call decisions, ideas and actions) and provide a way to understand how electro-chemical processes (the laws of chemistry and physics) are in play. While this model implies how neuronal constraints can increase the likelihood of making useful predictions of someone’s actions, consistent predictability cannot be assumed. Even with the constraining effects of genetic and experiential parameters, the web of neuronal interactions and their combinations may, in many instances, be so profoundly complex that final actions become unpredictable. This scenario is most apparent in highly motivated, focused and cognitively active individuals, regardless of the particular challenges they face. Human predictability is best understood as exhibiting an extensive range, with high likelihoods in some circumstances, and others approaching null. Newtonian predictive models almost always yield exceedingly high likelihoods, approximating precision, especially whenever simple objects constitute the data set. Humans are antithetical to simplicity, with their traits of constant learning, adapting and innovating. Capturing the spectrum of human actions requires a model accepting of unique, palpably unpredictable occurrences

The model of complex, adaptive biological systems adopted for this essay presumes a nuanced form of ontological reductionism, in so far as the mind is described as the brain at work—the interaction of electro-chemical processes. Consciousness is viewed as an evolved property of a species’ brain activity whenever an unidentified threshold of brain complexity is reached. Human agency—a phrase used in conjunction with consciousness and at times almost interchangeably—is viewed in a similar way. Both are pictured as higher-order attributes of the brain’s complexity as a result of neuronal activity, exclusively. But using the phrase “higher order attributes” does not suggest an inconsistency with the laws of chemistry and physics, and does not imply the brain’s complexity creates new, mysterious entities called “consciousness”, “agency” or “free will”. Rather, one can theorize that profound complexity generates brains with enhanced operational potential—for adapting, learning and innovation—and with characteristics (attributes) of consciousness and agency. The brain’s enhanced potential generates behavior we often consider definitive of our species (although other animals appear to share some of this behavior). What principles, in addition to the essential process of natural selection, could account for the development of these attributes—all emerging solely from electro-chemical interactions—is admittedly unknown at present. (Perhaps the generation of complexity itself, seen throughout all aspects of the Universe, is the fundamental phenomenon in question.)

A person’s self-awareness—consciousness—is one aspect of neuronal processing, and as an individual engages in problem-solving and innovation—subsets of the total neuronal activity we call thinking—a person is often aware of the progression’s relevant aspects. Consciousness is therefore viewed as co-extensive with other aspects of general neuronal activity. Further, processing is dynamic as our mind produces scenarios leading to conclusions and decisions. “Dynamic” becomes a descriptor for living, notably complex, adaptive systems. Characteristically, complex systems like humans are continually transforming and adapting. Paradigmatic Newtonian objects do not mirror the complex, adaptive model. Adaptation (or learning) is not taking place; only mass, velocity and trajectory are relevant, and accordingly, predictions are as close to precision as possible in a universe touched by random elements. The truism that human behavior is frequently predictable—at minimum approximately, and sometimes quite closely—is not surprising, and remains consistent with a description of our species using a non-Newtonian paradigm.

Perhaps little controversy would arise from this essay’s claims that sophisticated human actions—adapting, problem solving, innovating etc.—are frequently unpredictable, at least in any useful sense of the word. However, the issue remains whether, in principle, predictability describes the nature of the world at a fundamental level, in every given circumstance, including those of our mind. One could claim only the insufficiency of our technology masks this reality. But “predictability” should be used with considerable care. In the case of complex mental processing the following reasoning may be more appropriate: the ability to make predictions based upon precise knowledge of total neuronal activity is only possible (in principle) simultaneously with the completion of neuronal activity (thinking, problem-solving, innovating etc.). But this after-the-fact predictability is not genuine Newtonian predictability—it describes a process that has taken place. Neuronal activity involves such complexity and entanglement, including random combinations, that only the end result is precisely describable. Prior to the completion of mental processing no precise description (and hence prediction) is possible, even in principle. In these cases using the word “predictable” is ill-suited.

The biological model of complex, adaptive systems—in this case humans—does not imply an extra-ordinary character to the species. Humans are defined as complex electro-chemical systems. And while we describe ourselves, quite appropriately, as thinking, creating and decision-making creatures, other animals share important traits with us. In the future, consciousness and other mental functions may also be found in silicone-based systems. That each of us is a processing system, following the laws of physics and chemistry, provides a reality check on unreasonable presumptions. The model of complex, adaptive systems provides an inclusive framework for understanding what we are—and what we are not. While the Newtonian point of view remains especially useful as a technical tool in manipulating our environment, we need not extend its use universally. Using the Newtonian model, with its deterministic imagery, frames questions in a way not useful (or appropriate) in understanding complex human actions. Doing so leads us astray. Conceptual models—pictures and ideas—can become heuristic barriers, powerful patterns of thinking concealing meaningful characteristics of our experience. The complex, adaptive model offers alternative, open-ended descriptions of intriguing aspects of the world.