This essay examines ideas related to how we perceive moral and ethical thinking. A helpful first step is realizing how varied—even fragmented—thinking about moral issues can be. The population of ideas we’re trying to understand is not a tightly interrelated whole, but is much more like pieces strewn here and there. Similarities do exist, but their differences can be far greater, where specific presuppositions lead in very different directions. Relevant to much of the discussion will be the concept of “incommensurability”, implying the lack of any common framework or neutral point of reference that permits meaningful adjudication between competing moral traditions. Equally important will be interpreting several contemporary humanistic outlooks on morality, as well as their historical antecedents. For contrast, the nature of ethical and moral outlooks based on a fundamentalist interpretation of the Abrahamic faiths will also be examined. Briefly stated, this essay looks at the nature of morality as defined within various traditions, and to what degree the idea of incommensurability carries relevance.

Perhaps the moral outlooks most unlike today’s secular humanistic models are those originating centuries ago, although remaining influential today. Fundamentalist interpretations of the Abrahamic Faiths present world-views where an omniscient God-head creates moralities of certainty and timelessness, where moral values endure in their truth and relevance no matter the circumstances. Morality becomes universal and objectively secure, established necessarily through the theistic character of the cosmos. In assuming this conceptual framework, authentic moral values cannot be viewed as human-generated frameworks emerging from the evolution of culture, or by means of higher-order reasoning, but in a profound manner reflect a deeply hidden immanence, with its truth and verifiability inaccessible to contemporary modes of inquiry. The moral order’s certitude becomes fully luminous only through a life of faith. Significantly, the Abrahamic moral order must be understood as “external” to cultural creativity—it emerges from the God-head and becomes projected upon humanity.

In their critiques of the Abrahamic moral tradition, the European Enlightenment’s philosophers sought to anchor morality no less firmly, but by moral consensus through the power of human reason alone, rather than faith. Perhaps this effort’s clearest expression is found in Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative—the universalizability of any genuine moral principle. Kant’s position high-lighted the power of human reason and the autonomy of rational human agency. Due to our shared humanity, Kant’s imperative (considered by him a “moral law”) implied we must always treat other persons, and humanity in general, as an end in themselves, never as a mere means. Because the imperative is applied to others as well as oneself, Kant saw its formulation as universalizable, and hence approaching intellectual “objectivity”. Viewing the validity and meaning of the imperative as a product of reason alone—although intended to fundamentally affect social interactions—its social consequences were not its formal justification. In an extended sense “reason” replaced the immanence of the Abrahamic God-head.

Kant’s Scottish contemporary David Hume famously expressed skepticism toward the very idea of moral objectivity, whether based on reasoning alone, or derivable on the basis of reason plus factual information about the world. Moral positions could not be derived or implied by facts; moral or “ought” statements are distinct from “is” or factual statements. But Hume did not claim moral positions were purely subjective, and left some room for a more nuanced view of the role of both reason and empiricism in moral philosophies.

Later philosophers, notably the Utilitarian John Stuart Mill—who was very familiar with David Hume’s thinking—urged a much less rigid rationalism than Kant, emphasizing the criterion of social utility as the basis for a well-reasoned and empirically grounded moral framework. A moral rule or position is rationally justified if, in the long run, a rule provides for “the greatest good for the greatest number”. Broadly-based human well-being becomes a guiding principle for morality, as well as for legal and legislative structures—a purely humanistic referent supporting a moral outlook. Mill’s more empirical and practical orientation eliminated the notions of a “moral law” and a “law giver”, expressing a philosophy more relevant to the increasingly secular society in which he lived. While human reason remained an essential element in his viewpoint, reason as a self-sufficient process carried little appeal for him. For Mill, the context of human well-being within a society, interpreted on the broadest scale, became the necessary and controlling element in forming a consensus-based moral tradition. And Mill seemed to tacitly assume human rationality would lead to consensus on important moral issues, given favorable and nurturing circumstances, although the consensus forming process would likely become iterative, messy and always open to changes as circumstances evolved. His diluted form of moral consensus moved far from Kant’s universalizable, rationally-based moral imperative. An important caveat is the likelihood that Mill’s openness to consensus building may have been more a reflection of his belief in the superiority, and eventual global expansion, of secular, western intellectual traditions—especially the legacy of the Enlightenment—rather than a purposely reasoned explanation for eventual cross-cultural consensus of strongly held, contrasting values.

By the late 19th and early 20th Century, skepticism toward the very possibility for moral consensus and universalizability grew progressively stronger. Especially suspect was the idea of moral “objectivity”. An important and stimulating result was an increasing movement toward moral relativism and emotivism, the latter viewing morality as merely expressions of personal preference, and the former describing the reality of differing and incommensurable social traditions, especially concerning their morality and other fundamental values. Although emotivism appears to have been largely absorbed into the broader concept of incommensurability, its role in the rise and influence of moral relativism was major. Significant complexity was added to the philosophical issues when the relevance of incommensurability was extended to include nuances of meaning between differing languages, giving the concept extraordinary breadth, in some interpretations implying a genuine limitation to cross-language understanding.

Before entering the incommensurability issue any further, the phrase “moral objectivity” requires significant clarification. First, its use seems meaningful only when referring to world-views structured similarly to the Abrahamic Faiths. Otherwise, it becomes oddly out of place. An example was the early 20thCentury philosopher G. E. Moore, who proposed a fully rationally-based ethical theory encompassing non-natural, yet objective moral properties. Few, if any skeptics have ever been convinced of its efficacy. The idea of non-natural, objective ethical properties appears opaque, if not unintelligible, especially in today’s intellectual environment. Long ago Hume was both astute and honest in acknowledging that moral principles are not objective the way statements of verifiable facts about the world can be objective. But as will be discussed later, moral principles are not simply arbitrary or purely subjective, either. The issue carries a large degree of complexity, and only modest measures of clarity.

Returning to the concept of incommensurability as applied to cross-language understanding, its impact moderates considerably once we consider the empirical realities of 2nd or 3rd language acquisition by non-native speakers. While unique nuances of meaning may not be precisely captured as a new language is absorbed, it makes no sense to assume truly significant chasms in understanding occur within multi-language contexts. The world teems with language users capable of shifting effortlessly from one language to another, even within contexts of especially complex communication. That a particular unique meaning may reside in one language, and not another, has not created a serious barrier to otherwise powerful and effective cross-language communication. But shifting the focus to contrasting moral principles brings different issues, where incommensurability can become relevant as we examine distinct positions along a spectrum of moral frameworks.

Comparing two hypothetical ethical frameworks, significantly different yet sharing some characteristics, (both containing secular and democratic elements) shows just how varied and cross-pollinated moral philosophies can be. The first—social liberalism—emphasizes social cohesion, an equitable distribution of wealth, inclusive democracy, widespread social services and intellectual freedom. Individualism is highly valued, but is constrained socially and legally whenever its full implications conflict with society’s health, or the long-term well-being of the species. A second society includes a tradition of democracy and constitutional rule of law, similar to social liberalism, but with substantially reduced social services, and importantly, places an extraordinary emphasis on the primacy of the individual—a fully articulated libertarian point of view. Libertarians often view “society” is a construct of language only, and are unwilling to grant the idea of society a legitimate status in conversations about moral ideals. A libertarian market economy incorporates few imbedded constraints that might otherwise ameliorate exaggerated inequalities.

Assuming appropriate circumstances, especially sincerity and honesty, conversations between adherents of these ethical philosophies actually occur in the real world, and each can understand, in a general sense, what the other is saying, and often gain a clearer understanding of the other’s values. Yet it is also true both proponents would likely conclude a conversation with their views largely, if not wholly, intact. That moral outlooks often remain unchanged—even within mutually sincere conversations—reflects how impactful fundamental moral values can be—they determine an individual’s choice of how best to live, and their vision of an ideal society. These deepest, personally-defining moral values develop in each of us through a complex pattern of events, circumstances, and experiences, many affecting us non-consciously. We never know fully the myriad causes creating the unique person each of us has become. In part, the concept of incommensurability answers why our deepest values are so resistant to change, especially whenever the change-strategy relies wholly upon arguments restricted to objective, factual contexts. This is the central thesis of incommensurability--the lack of any neutral point of reference allowing adjudication between competing moral traditions. No syllogism or other logical implication can be formed to permit adjudication, hence there can be no compelling consensus. David Hume expressed these ideas over two centuries ago. Any suggested point of reference for final moral adjudication would lead to a fruitless regression to an endless series of candidate points of reference.

While incommensurability remains a useful concept in important circumstances, we know, both from present experience and historical precedent, that a person’s deepest moral values—as well as the larger society’s moral philosophy—do indeed change, sometimes incrementally, but at other times dramatically. Acknowledging this, and examining what contexts have produced varying degrees of moral consensus, removes much of the skepticism toward creating more cohesive, yet pluralistic societies. For a functional degree of moral consensus to take place, there must be a substantial likelihood that moral commitments can truly evolve, both on individual and societal scales. It’s undeniable that exceptional experiences, through a synthesis of emotions and ideas, can deeply influence individuals or groups, bringing long-lasting impacts, realigning one’s deepest values and presuppositions. Or it may be a series of realizations over time, cumulatively transforming values. In whatever way we might describe the process, it’s categorically unlike a strictly reasoned and phrased narrative. Significant changes are most often infused with emotion.

One way to describe how morality evolves is through the concept of persuasive descriptions, where adherents of a particular moral system—like the scenario between social liberalism and libertarianism—describe real-life implications of moral systems, emphasizing their effects on every member of society. This is an iterative, long-term process, perhaps best described as an emotionally driven quest with empirical and conceptual elements. Moral systems carry vital human consequences, and an honest appraisal realistically portrays their impact—measuring both well-being and the likelihood of adverse experiences. The responsibility for proponents of any moral system is to actively persuade their fellow humans, who may be either indifferent or opposed, that a particular moral standpoint will lead to the most desirable consequences, for both themselves and society. This is genuine moral rationality—articulating and advocating, both intellectually and emotionally, the implications of a favored moral outlook. Moral advocacy likewise reveals our shared humanity, especially in the more egalitarian moral models where the concept becomes most meaningful. Our near history offers powerful examples of embracing our shared humanity, where opponents of a moral and political system that supported racial hierarchies was effectively challenged, and in large measure, by showing its ugliness to an important segment of a previously apathetic public—1960s civil rights movement. Their vision of a just and more equitable society was juxtaposed to the brutality and suffering caused by an entrenched system. The ethical outrage and impetus for change resulting from the movement were emotionally charged, yet inseparable from the idea of equality before the law. Persuasive descriptions are the path to moral consensus, not complete unanimity, but an operational majority capable of supporting a sustainable society. That the views of a minority of citizens within a society remains unchanged is not surprising. This unremarkable truth about human behavior mirrors the reality of incommensurability, but does not preclude the emergence of a functional moral consensus, even within large and divergent societies.